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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Interpreting the term “willfully” can be a challenge. It 
is a “chameleon word,” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 
210 (3d Cir. 2009), and “[i]n any closely reasoned problem, 
whether legal or nonlegal, chameleon hued words are a peril 
both to clear thought and to lucid expression,” Bryan A. 
Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 145 (2d ed. 
1995) (quoting Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions 35 (1919) (reprint 1966)). But we take comfort 
knowing that we do not struggle alone with this “notoriously 
malleable” concept. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 202 
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, “willfully” is “a word of 
many meanings” whose definition is “dependent on the context 
in which it appears.” Id. at 191 (majority opinion). And just as 
a chameleon’s appearance depends on the surroundings, we 
look to the whole text of a law to best “interpret the words 
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consistent with their ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress 
enacted the statute.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2067, 2070 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). We approach that task with a full box of 
“traditional tools” of construction. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 
2400, 2415 (2019). Aided by these principles, interpreting 
“willfully” seems less troublesome. 
 Kenneth Smukler asks us to do just the opposite, 
arguing for an exceptional understanding of “willfully” in 
otherwise unexceptional statutes. But the ordinary 
understanding of “willfully” is the best one. Smukler does, 
however, rightly point out that the District Court departed from 
our prior decisions when instructing the jury on two of his nine 
counts of conviction. So we will vacate his conviction on those 
counts. Smukler also brings a host of other procedural and 
substantive challenges from his trial. Finding none with merit, 
we will affirm his other convictions. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Kenneth Smukler made a thirty-year career in the rough 
and tumble world of campaign politics. From mayors and city 
councils, to members of Congress and presidents, Smukler 
steered campaigns across Pennsylvania. And as an attorney, 
Smukler developed familiar expertise with Federal Election 
Commission (“FEC”) law. Then, as it sometimes does in 
politics, things went wrong. 
A. The 2012 Democratic Primary for the First 
Congressional District of Pennsylvania 
 
 In 2012, United States Representative Bob Brady ran 
for reelection to represent Pennsylvania’s First Congressional 
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District in Philadelphia. Jimmie Moore, a former Philadelphia 
Municipal Court Judge, challenged Brady in the Democratic 
primary. Moore struggled to raise money, so he personally 
loaned his campaign about $150,000. It was not enough, and 
Moore soon concluded that he would not win. He turned to 
Plan B, reaching out to former Philadelphia Mayor Wilson 
Goode to arrange a meeting between himself and Brady, with 
Goode providing the “glue.” (App. at 971, 1555.) 
 In a scheme lacking only a smoke-filled backroom, 
Moore, Goode, and Brady hashed out a deal for Moore to drop 
out of the race. In exchange, Brady agreed to give Moore 
$90,000 to pay off campaign debts and reimburse some of 
Moore’s campaign loan. Of course, as Moore, Goode, and 
Brady all knew, one candidate cannot bribe another candidate 
to drop out of an election. They needed a plan to steer the 
money to Moore. Brady suggested that he buy a poll that 
Moore had conducted. The purpose was plain: “mov[e] money 
from Bob Brady’s campaign to Jimmie Moore’s campaign.” 
(App. at 1318.) With an agreement in place, Moore dropped 
out of the race a few days later, clearing Brady’s path to the 
Democratic nomination.  
 But the money still needed a mover, and Smukler 
emerged as the middleman. Once Moore formally dropped out, 
Smukler met with Moore “to make the arrangements” and “set 
up the process for [Moore] to get the money.” (App. at 953, 
1071.) Smukler proposed a three-part scheme. First, they 
would set up a bogus corporation to receive the funds from the 
Brady campaign. Then, Moore would create “some dummy 
invoices.” (App. at 954, 1063.) Finally, Smukler would pay 
Moore in three installments, through cash sent to Moore’s 
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campaign manager and romantic partner, Carolyn Cavaness.1 
For good measure, Smukler would route the payments to 
Cavaness through the consulting firm of Donald “D.A.” Jones, 
a political consultant working for Brady, for work that 
Cavaness never performed.2 All went as planned, including, of 
 
1 Smukler advised Cavaness that the Brady campaign would 
pay $65,000 in two installments for old polling data from the 
Moore campaign. According to Smukler’s instructions, Moore 
and Cavaness set up a shell company, CavaSense and 
Associates, LLC, that would sell the old poll to Smukler. 
Through the shell company, Cavaness would contract with 
Voterlink Data Systems (“VDS”), a company operated by 
Smukler, so that VDS would pay $65,000 in two installments 
for the poll. On June 11, 2012, the Brady campaign paid VDS 
$40,000 for “Survey and Polling Services.” Two days later, 
VDS paid CavaSense the first installment of $40,000 in a check 
signed by Smukler. On July 10, 2012, the Brady campaign 
wrote another check to VDS in the amount of $25,000. One 
week later, on July 17, 2012, VDS wrote CavaSense a second 
check, also signed by Smukler, for $25,000. Both checks 
arrived in Cavaness’ personal bank account shortly after 
receipt.  
2 Under Smukler’s plan, the Brady campaign would pay Jones 
$25,000 and, in turn, Jones would pay Cavaness $25,000. A 
plan Jones was comfortable with “[a]s long as it wasn’t [his] 
money.” (App. at 1320.) On June 20, 2012, Cavaness sent 
Jones an email with invoices from CavaSense, totaling 
$25,000. Jones waited until he received the money from 
Brady’s campaign before paying Cavaness. Then the Brady 
campaign cut a check to Jones in the amount of $25,000 for 
“Political Consulting.” Around seven days later, Jones sent a 
check to CavaSense for $25,000. Cavaness did no work for 
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course, both campaigns omitting accurate reporting of any of 
these transactions to the FEC.  
B. The 2014 Democratic Primary for the Thirteenth 
Congressional District of Pennsylvania 
 
 In 2014, former United States Representative Marjorie 
Margolies launched a comeback bid. Like many elections, 
congressional contests occur in two cycles: a primary election, 
where candidates of the same political party square off, 
followed by a general election between the prevailing 
candidates of each party to decide who will represent the 
people. Federal election law limits contributions to a candidate 
in both phases. So while candidates may collect primary and 
general election funds at any time, they cannot use general 
election funds to pay for primary election expenses. That 
means if a candidate loses the primary, the campaign refunds 
any general election contributions to donors.  
 Margolies faced a crowded field of primary opponents 
and hired Smukler to run her campaign. But as the race dragged 
on, Margolies ran low on funds and Smukler dipped into the 
general election reserve. It wasn’t enough; Smukler needed 
more money to cover crucial campaign expenses like media 
buys. So he leaned on friends and family to get cash quickly, 
using them as straw men to evade federal election laws and 
pass through money to the campaign. We detail several of 
those donations and associated misrepresentations.  
  
 
Jones in exchange for the cash. In fact, when Cavaness sent the 
invoices, Jones had “never met her.” (App. at 1328.) 
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1. Smukler Sends $78,750 to the Margolies 
Campaign 
 
On April 29, 2014, Smukler emailed Jennifer May, 
Treasurer of the Margolies campaign, “I will be wiring $78,750 
of the segregated media account funds into the campaign media 
account.” (Supp. App. at 461.) No such “segregated media 
account” existed. A few days later, he wired $78,750 from his 
personal brokerage account to another of his companies, Black 
and Blue Media. From there, he wired the same amount from 
Black and Blue Media to a new Margolies campaign account 
to quickly pay vendors. Then Smukler asked his brother for 
$75,000, which his brother promptly sent to Smukler’s 
brokerage.  
2. The Campaign Spends Money Earmarked for the 
General Election and Smukler Steers Another 
$150,000 to Cover the Difference 
 
Still short on cash, Smukler directed May to use general 
election funds on the primary. A deficit soon swelled, as the 
primary fund declined to a negative cash on hand of $126,761 
and change. Then, Margolies lost the primary, leaving the 
campaign sixty days to refund all general election 
contributions. May suggested that Margolies pay the deficit 
herself, a lawful option that Smukler declined. Instead, he 
asked campaign officials, including May, to tell him “exactly 
what amount [Smukler’s two companies:] InfoVoter and Black 
[and] Blue need to return to the campaign to reconcile all 
general fund contributions” as he “intend[ed] to transfer [the 
money].” (App. at 774.) Sensibly, May concluded that if 
Margolies did not write a check for the overage, “we are all in 
really big trouble.” (App. at 2212.)  
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May was correct; Smukler was undeterred. He surprised 
May with the claim that the Margolies campaign “did not 
spend the general [election] money as it was escrowed in” 
Smukler’s consulting company InfoVoter. (App. at 2212.) 
“[O]nce the money is refunded,” Smukler explained, “all the 
general [election] checks will be issued within the [sixty-day] 
period.” (App. at 2212.) That same day, an old friend of 
Smukler’s, Kevin Morgan, wired $150,000 into Smukler’s 
personal brokerage account. Two days later, Smukler wired 
$40,000 from his personal account to Black and Blue Media 
and $110,000 from his personal account to InfoVoter. It all 
wound up in the Margolies campaign in two separate transfers 
from Black and Blue Media and InfoVoter. Smukler directed 
both payments to appear as “[r]efund[s]” on the next FEC 
report. (App. at 610, 791–800; Supp. App. at 194.)3 
3. Smukler Conceals the Transfers 
 
 Smukler had another problem. Back in April, one of 
Margolies’ opponents filed a complaint with the FEC alleging 
that the campaign had spent general election contributions on 
primary election expenses. That was true, so Smukler spun a 
false tale to the campaign’s attorney, causing him to lie in the 
campaign’s response to the FEC. Based on Smukler’s 
representations, the campaign’s attorney wrote to the FEC that 
 
3 As in 2012, Smukler used Jones as a “pass-through.” 
(App. at 1356.) He asked Jones to write a check to the 
Margolies campaign, for which he would reimburse Jones for 
the contribution. Which Smukler did by sending Jones a check 
from InfoVoter in the amount of $2,600. Jones only made the 




the Margolies campaign had “agreed to advance a portion of 
[general election] funds” to certain “campaign vendors in order 
to secure their services . . . for the general election.” (App. at 
2230.) But because “[t]he advanced funds would . . . pay for 
general election . . . expenses of the vendors,” after Margolies 
lost the primary, the vendors “refunded the advanced payments 
to the committee.” (App. at 2230.) Smukler’s argument 
benefited from apparent support from the campaign’s FEC 
filings, which had also described the payments from Smukler’s 
companies as “refunds.” (App. at 610, 791–800; Supp. App. at 
194.) Based on the letter, the FEC dismissed the complaint.  
4. The Margolies Conduit Contribution 
 The hasty movement of money between Smukler’s 
companies and the campaign eventually caught the eye of the 
FEC. For one thing, Smukler’s companies “refunded” the 
Margolies campaign $18,000 more than the campaign paid. 
But companies cannot send back more than they received 
without categorizing the payment as a corporate contribution. 
The campaign told the FEC that the discrepancy was a mere 
error and returned $18,000 back to InfoVoter. That caused 
more problems by putting the now-defunct campaign back into 
debt. Ever ready with a solution, Smukler told Margolies that 
although she was on the hook, he would cover the deficit and 
“write a check for [$]25,000” from Black and Blue Media “and 
that [she] would then write a check” back to the campaign. 
(App. at 1216, 1237–40.) She did so. The campaign classified 
it as a loan on the next FEC report.  
C. Tolling Agreements, Indictment, Trial, and Appeal 
 All of this consulting attracted the interest of law 
enforcement. With investigations mounting, Smukler and the 
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Government entered into two tolling agreements “regarding 
charges arising out of a payment from the Bob Brady for 
Congress campaign committee on or about August 23, 2012 to 
D. Jones & Associates in the amount of $25,000 and the 
subsequent use of that money by D. Jones & Associates.”4 
(App. at 133, 133–39.) The first agreement extended the time 
for the Government to bring certain charges against Smukler 
from August 23, 2017 to September 26, 2017, while the second 
agreement extended the statute of limitations from September 
26, 2017 to October 26, 2017.5 A grand jury later returned a 
 
4 Both agreements advise Smukler that “the United 
States contends that this conduct may give rise to a number of 
violations of federal criminal law, including but not limited to 
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2 (aiding and abetting), 
371 (conspiracy), and 1001 (false statements), and Title 52, 
United States Code, Section 30109 (campaign finance 
violations).” (App. at 133, 137.) In both agreements, Smukler 
also acknowledges that he “understand[s] that by agreeing to 
toll, and thus not to assert, the claim of statute of limitations, 
[he is] giving up any rights [he] may have under the federal 
statute of limitations provisions regarding charges that may 
result from the investigation described in this document.” 
(App. at 134, 138.) 
5 The tolling provision in the second agreement is more 
broadly worded: “I hereby agree to toll any applicable statute 
of limitations regarding charges arising out of a payment from 
the Bob Brady for Congress campaign committee on or about 
August 23, 2012 to D. Jones & Associates in the amount of 
$25,000 and the subsequent use of that money by D. Jones & 
Associates, as well as any charges arising out of campaign 
finance reports filed by Bob Brady for Congress and Jimmie 
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superseding indictment charging Smukler with eleven counts 
of various election law offenses related to both the 2012 and 
2014 congressional elections.6 Following trial, a jury returned 
 
Moore for Congress, from September 26, 2017 to October 26, 
2017.” (App. at 137–38 (emphasis added).) 
6 The grand jury returned an original indictment on 
October 24, 2017, charging Smukler and then-co-defendant 
Jones with certain election law offenses relating to former 
Congressman Bob Brady’s 2012 primary campaign. Jones later 
pleaded guilty and cooperated against Smukler. Along with 
charges related to Smukler’s work on the 2012 Brady 
campaign, the March 20, 2018 superseding indictment charged 
Smukler with offenses related to the Margolies 2014 campaign.  
Counts I through V of the superseding indictment 
related to the 2012 congressional primary campaign. Those 
counts charged Smukler with: conspiracy to commit campaign 
law violations and to make false statements, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (Count I); causing campaign contributions in 
excess of federal limits, in violation of 52 U.S.C. 
§§ 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30116(f), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count II); 
causing the Brady campaign committee to make false reports 
to the FEC, in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(1), 
30104(b)(5)(A), 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 
III); causing the Moore campaign committee to make false 
reports to the FEC, in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(1), 
30104(b)(5)(A), 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 
IV); and engaging in a scheme to falsify and conceal facts from 
the FEC, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001(a)(1) (Count 
V). 
Counts VI through XI related to Marjorie Margolies’ 
2014 congressional primary campaign. Those counts charged 
Smukler with: engaging in a scheme to falsify and conceal facts 
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a guilty verdict on nine of the eleven charges, acquitting 
Smukler on the remainder. He received a sentence of eighteen 
months’ imprisonment, along with fines and assessments. 
Smukler now challenges on appeal a mix of procedural and 
substantive issues from his trial. 
 First, Smukler argues that the District Court incorrectly 
instructed the jury on the mens rea element of the federal 
criminal laws requiring the Government to prove that Smukler 
acted “willfully.” The District Court explained that “the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant knew his conduct was unlawful and intended to do 
something that the law forbids.” (App. at 1943.) “That is,” the 
Court continued, “to find that the defendant acted willfully, 
you must find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant acted with a purpose to disobey or 
disregard the law.” (App. at 1943.) Smukler sought different 
 
from the FEC, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001(a)(1) 
(Count VI); making campaign contributions in excess of 
federal limits, in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 
30116(f), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count VII); making $2,000 or 
more in conduit contributions in the name of another, in 
violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(ii), 30116(f), 30122, 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count VIII); making $10,000 or more in 
conduit contributions in the name of another, in violation of 52 
U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(D), 30116(f), 30122, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 
(Count IX); causing a campaign committee to make false 
reports to the FEC, in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(1), 
30104(b)(5)(A), 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 
X); and obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 




language: that “the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the specific law 
prohibiting the conduct at issue, and that he acted with the 
intent to violate that specific law.” (App. at 312.) In rejecting 
Smukler’s proposed instruction, the District Court explained 
that it would follow “the mens rea standard of willfulness 
based on [the] Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions . . . and 
will not cover [Smukler’s] inconsistent instructions requested 
on that issue.” (App. at 12–13.) Smukler argues that because 
the Government charged him with violations in the federal 
election law context, our precedent required the District Court 
to charge the jury under a “heightened” standard of “willfully.” 
 Second, Smukler claims the District Court erred when 
it denied his motion to dismiss Count II of the superseding 
indictment. Count II charged that Smukler “willfully caused 
contributions to the Jimmie Moore for Congress campaign in 
excess of the limits of the Election Act,” based on the three 
payments totaling $90,000 made from the Brady campaign in 
exchange for Moore’s withdrawal from the race. (App. at 109.) 
Those payments included (1) the June 11, 2012 payment of 
$40,000 routed through VDS; (2) the July 10, 2012 payment of 
$25,000, also sent through VDS; and (3) the August 23, 2012 
payment of $25,000 steered through D. Jones & Associates. 
Smukler argued that the tolling agreement did not cover two of 
the three alleged payments, leaving those payments outside the 
statute of limitations. The District Court disagreed, and held 
that under United States v. Dees, 215 F.3d 378 (3d Cir. 2000), 
as applied to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 
“[t]he Government properly charged that [Smukler] and his co-
conspirators caused payments aggregating at least $25,000 in 
a calendar year, between June 2012 and August 2012,” (App. 
at 25.), as “the offense . . . was completed on the date of the 
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last payment and the statute of limitations began running at that 
time,” (App. at 23.)  
 Third, Smukler challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction on Count V. That count 
charged Smukler with causing the Brady and Moore 
campaigns to make false reports to the FEC, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(1) and 2(b). On appeal, Smukler argues that 
the evidence could not prove that he “caused the Brady or 
Moore campaign to report or fail to report anything to the 
FEC.” (Opening Br. at 36.)  
 Finally, Smukler contends that the District Court erred 
by failing to give specific unanimity charges as to Counts V 
and X. Each of those counts, Smukler claims, “charged two 
different acts,” that “independently constituted a criminal 
offense under the statute(s) cited,” thereby violating his right 
to a unanimous jury verdict. (Opening Br. at 40.)  
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because 
Smukler appeals from the final judgment of the District Court. 
 The parties dispute our standard of review for the 
District Court’s “willfully” instruction. (Compare Opening Br. 
at 23, with Response Br. at 29.) Both cite authority that traces 
to United States v. Zehrbach, where we considered the basis 
for an objection to a jury instruction on a record “not entirely 
clear.” 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). On the 
one hand, “if the objection is construed as a challenge to the 
court’s statement of the legal standard, we exercise plenary 
review.” Id. On the other, if “the objection [is] read as a 
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challenge merely to the confusing nature of the instruction,” 
we will “review the trial court’s expression for abuse of 
discretion.” Id. at 1260, 1264. Smukler disputes only the legal 
standard behind the District Court’s instruction. So “[w]e 
exercise plenary review over [Smukler’s] challenges to the 
legal standards expressed in jury instructions.” United States v. 
Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d at 1260). 
 Our review of Smukler’s claim that the District Court 
erred in rejecting his motion to dismiss Count II is mixed. 
United States v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2016). 
We “review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and 
its factual determinations, including its findings about the 
contents and purposes of the acts alleged in the Indictment, for 
clear error.” Id. As to Smukler’s claim that the evidence could 
not support the jury’s verdict on Count V for causing false 
statements to the FEC, our review is “highly deferential.” 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc). We “will overturn a verdict only ‘if no 
reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to 
support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 430–41 (quoting United States v. 
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 Last, we review Smukler’s claim that the District Court 
erred by not instructing the jury on specific unanimity as to 
Counts V and X for plain error because Smukler failed to 
object to this issue at trial. United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 




III.  INTERPRETING “WILLFULLY” 
 
 Much of our task involves interpretation, a familiar 
pursuit because Congress does not always define each word in 
a statute. That does not invite invention. “After all, if judges 
could freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings, we 
would risk amending legislation outside the ‘single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure’ the 
Constitution commands.” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. 
Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 
(1983)). Instead, we rely on the “fundamental canon of 
statutory construction” requiring that we “interpret the words 
consistent with their ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress 
enacted the statute.” Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2070, 2074 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also United States v. Johnman, 948 F.3d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 
2020). It is a focused inquiry and “[o]ur analysis begins and 
ends with the text.” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & 
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2380 (2020) 
(quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
572 U.S. 545, 553 (2014)). We rely on our “toolkit” containing 
“all the standard tools of interpretation” used to “carefully 
consider the text, structure, history, and purpose” of the statute. 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–15 (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted). That allows us to “‘reach a conclusion 
about the best interpretation,’ thereby resolving any perceived 
ambiguity.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 788 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)). With that 
framework as our guide, we turn first to Smukler’s objection 




A.  “Willfully” and the Criminal Law  
 
  Interpreting the legal term “willfully” is a good 
example of a “hard interpretive conundrum[].” Kisor, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2415. Sometimes, and “[m]ost obviously,” “[willfully] 
differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct.” 
Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191. “[B]ut in the criminal law,” the word 
“also typically refers to a culpable state of mind.” Id. Often, 
that requires the Government to “prove that the defendant acted 
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 192 
(quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)). 
 Often, but not always. Sometimes “a more 
particularized [‘willfully’] showing is required.” Id. Then, “the 
jury must find that the defendant was aware of the specific 
provision of the [statute] that he was charged with violating.” 
Id. at 194 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 
(1991)). In Bryan, the Supreme Court explained that 
prosecutions “involv[ing] highly technical statutes that 
presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in 
apparently innocent conduct,” id., justified a “carve out . . . 
exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse,” id. at 195 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted). Under this narrow departure from the ordinary legal 
meaning of “willfully,” the Government must “pro[ve] that the 
defendant was subjectively aware of the duty at issue, [which] 
would avoid . . . unfair results.” Id. at 195 n.22 (quoting United 
States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 502 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, 
C.J., concurring)). But the Court has limited the “need for 
[mens rea] specificity” only to certain cases involving the tax 
code and similarly complex laws governing financial 
institutions. Id. at 194–95 & n.22 (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 
201; Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138, 149); see also Aversa, 984 F.2d 
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at 502 (Breyer, C.J., concurring) (observing that “criminal 
prosecutions for ‘currency law’ violations . . . very much 
resemble criminal prosecutions for tax law violations” because 
“[b]oth sets of laws are technical; and both sets of laws 
sometimes criminalize conduct that would not strike an 
ordinary citizen as immoral or likely unlawful”). 
Smukler and the Government dispute which 
interpretation of “willfully” should apply here.7 We have 
already answered that question and applied the heightened 
“willfully” standard to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) 
and 1001 “in the federal election law context.” United States v. 
Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994). That requires us to 
vacate Smukler’s convictions at Counts V and VI. But we will 
uphold Smukler’s convictions on all other counts, because 
FECA is best read to contain the ordinary meaning of 
“willfully.”  
1. Judicial Interpretations of “Willfully”  
 
 Smukler’s argument proceeds from a mistaken reading 
of caselaw, not the best reading of the statute. Recall that he 
 
7 Count XI charged Smukler with obstruction of justice, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1505, and did not require 
proof of willfulness. “To prove a violation of § 1505, the 
government must show: ‘(1) that there was an agency 
proceeding; (2) that the defendant was aware of that 
proceeding; and (3) that the defendant intentionally 
endeavored corruptly to influence, obstruct or impede the 
pending proceeding.’” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 
325 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bhagat, 436 F.3d 
1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006)). So we will uphold his conviction 
on this count. 
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asked for a jury instruction incorporating a heightened 
“willfully” standard requiring the Government to prove both 
that he knew the specific law prohibiting his actions and that 
he intended to violate that specific law. His support is our 
decision in Curran holding “that a proper charge for 
willfulness in cases brought under sections 2(b) and 1001 [of 
Title 18] in the federal election law context requires the 
prosecution to prove that [the] defendant knew of the [specific 
legal] obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those 
obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful.” 20 
F.3d at 569. Smukler urges us to extend Curran’s heightened 
“willfully” standard to all charges brought under section 2(b) 
and FECA. But that conflicts with both our precedent and an 
ordinary interpretation of “willfully.”  
An overview of our jurisprudence cases sets the stage. 
Curran relies on the Supreme Court’s opinions in Cheek and 
Ratzlaf, cases involving federal tax and financial laws. Both 
are notable for their rarity. Cheek held that a mens rea of 
“willfully” in the criminal tax statutes 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 
7203 required actual knowledge of the relevant legal duty. 498 
U.S. at 202–07. The Court reasoned that the “average citizen” 
often struggles to comply with our nation’s sprawling tax 
system. Id. at 199–200. From that assumption, the Court 
intuited that Congress had “softened the impact of the 
common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate 
the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses.” Id. 
at 200. But the Court was quick to acknowledge the “general 
rule” “deeply rooted in the American legal system”: 
“[I]gnorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to 
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 199. 
A similar conclusion arrived in Ratzlaf, a case involving 
cash structuring contrary to 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3). 
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Concerned that these complex provisions might trip up 
ordinary people, the Court held that establishing “willful” 
violations of structuring requires the government to prove 
knowledge that the specific structuring behavior was unlawful. 
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141, 144–46, 149. But as in Cheek, the 
Court emphasized these circumstances represented the 
extraordinary instance where ignorance of the law was a 
defense to a criminal charge. Id. at 149. 
We decided Curran shortly after Ratzlaf. Both cases 
concerned disclosure obligations imposed by regulatory laws. 
Curran, 20 F.3d at 569. And both involved prosecution under 
statutes with a mens rea of “willfully.” See id. at 568. Given 
these similarities, we applied the Cheek-Ratzlaf standard to 
tandem charges brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001 in 
the elections context. Id. at 569. But more recent decisions 
from the Supreme Court, and ours, clarify that Cheek and 
Ratzlaf do not sweep further. Rather, they remain the 
exceptions that prove the rule. 
Take Bates v. United States, where the Supreme Court 
considered the meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a), which makes 
it a felony to “knowingly and willfully” misapply student loan 
funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 
1965. There, the petitioner urged the Court to find, as in 
Ratzlaf, that the actual intent to defraud was an essential, 
although unexpressed, element of the offense. Bates v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 23, 30 (1997). But the Court rejected any 
comparison: “Ratzlaf,” it wrote, turned on the “particular 
statutory context” of complex currency structuring 
transactions. Id. at 31 n.6. 
The Supreme Court was even clearer a year later in 
Bryan construing the prohibition on interstate transfers of 
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firearms in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). The petitioner argued 
that the Cheek-Ratzlaf standard required the government prove 
he knew about the federal licensing regime. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 
189–90. But the Court distinguished Ratzlaf and Cheek as 
matters “involv[ing] highly technical statutes that presented the 
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently 
innocent conduct.” Id. at 194. “[W]illfulness,” the Court 
admonished, does not “carve out an exception to the traditional 
rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Id. at 196. And it 
reaffirmed that logic in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 
characterizing readings of willfulness that require “specific 
intent to violate a known legal duty” as, again, applying to 
“highly technical statutes.” 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (citing 
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200–01). 
We have followed the same path. In Starnes, guided by 
Bryan, we observed that “willfully” has “at least three levels of 
interpretation.” Starnes, 583 F.3d at 210. In some contexts, 
“willfully” may indicate “an act which is intentional, or 
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In others, particularly in the 
criminal context, it may require the government to prove that 
the defendant acted “not merely voluntarily, but with a bad 
purpose, that is, with knowledge that his conduct was, in some 
general sense, unlawful.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). And finally, “in some rare instances,” we observed 
that “‘willfully’ has been read to require proof that the 
defendant actually knew of the specific law prohibiting the 
conduct.” Id. at 211 (emphasis added). But like Bryan, we 
pointed out that these unusual cases involve only “highly 
technical statutes” and, in Curran, the unusual instance of a 
tandem election prosecution brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) 
and 1001. Id.; accord United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 
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238, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The justification for requiring 
knowledge of the relevant tax laws is that, ‘in our complex tax 
system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who 
earnestly wish to follow the law, and it is not the purpose of the 
law to penalize frank difference[s] of opinion or innocent 
errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205)).  
Smukler reaches for the rarest meaning, pushing to 
extend the extraordinary Cheek-Ratzlaf “willfully” standard 
not just to the charges brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 
1001, but to his substantive FECA charges as well. Curran, he 
maintains, requires as much. It does not. As the Supreme Court 
and we have repeatedly explained, the Cheek-Ratzlaf 
interpretation applies to “complex[],” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200, 
or “highly technical,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194, statutes. And 
Smukler does not specify what about FECA he finds to be 
“complex” or “highly technical.” He protests its length in a 
footnote. (See Reply Br. at 4 n.5.) True enough, as FECA packs 
in rules for contributions (and a host of other conduct) that 
candidates, campaigns, and contributors must follow when 
engaging in election politicking. But those rules are reasonably 
straightforward and written in common terms. One provision 
sets forth the contribution limits applicable to every 
congressional candidate in each election cycle. 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30116. Another makes it unlawful for individuals to 
contribute in the names of others. Id. § 30122. A third requires 
honestly reporting contributions received to the FEC. Id. § 
30104. Civil and criminal penalties can result from a 
“knowing[] and willful[]” violation of FECA. Id. § 30109(d). 
But “compared with anti-structuring or tax laws, as in Ratzlaf 
or Cheek, individual campaign contribution laws are more 
intuitive and less complex.” United States v. Danielczyk, 788 
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F. Supp. 2d 472, 490 (E.D. Va. 2011), reversed in part on other 
grounds, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012). All of which speaks to 
an ordinary, not extraordinary, set of prohibitions. Consistent 
with precedent, we likewise apply the ordinary reading of 
“willfully” to FECA. 
  2. Applying Familiar Principles of Interpretation 
Smukler next suggests that the Cheek-Ratzlaf 
heightened “willfully” standard is warranted since his FECA 
offenses follow the “aiding and abetting” prohibitions of 18 
U.S.C. § 2(b).8 Section 2(b) of Title 18 makes it a crime for a 
person to “willfully cause[] an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him . . . would be an offense against the United 
States.” The statute “imposes liability on a defendant who does 
not himself commit the prohibited actus reus, but intentionally 
manipulates an innocent intermediary to commit the prohibited 
actus reus.” United States v. Gumbs, 283 F.3d 128, 134 (3d 
Cir. 2002). As we explained, Curran held that the mens rea 
element required under § 2(b) for causing a false statement in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 goes beyond the mens rea 
required by § 1001 and applied the Cheek-Ratzlaf reading of 
“willfully.”9 See 20 F.3d at 567–69. Smukler seems to contend 
 
8 The substantive FECA charges alleged in Counts II, 
VII, VIII, IX, and X all require proof that Smukler acted 
“willfully.” He was also charged with “willfully caus[ing]” the 
violations. The Government acknowledges that Smukler did 
not personally transmit false statements to the FEC, so Counts 
V, VI, and X require proof that he “willfully cause[d]” those 
acts under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).  
9 We have divorced 18 U.S.C. § 1001 from the Cheek-
Ratzlaf heightened willfully requirement when not paired with 
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we must do the same for his FECA offenses charged under § 
2(b), even if the “willfully” mens rea in his substantive FECA 
charges would not be so read. (It will not, as we already 
explained.) 
 
§ 2(b). In Starnes, we applied 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)’s false 
statements statute to a regulatory scheme that subjected the 
defendants to criminal liability under the Clean Air Act. There, 
we noted that Curran, relying on Ratzlaf, “held that the strictest 
interpretation of criminal willfulness governed tandem 
violations of §§ 1001 and 2(b) in the ‘federal election law 
context.’” Starnes, 583 F.3d at 211. But since that case 
involved neither § 2(b) nor election law, Curran’s heightened 
standard did not apply. Instead, we held that § 1001’s 
“knowingly and willfully” requirement meant that the 
government must only show that “a defendant acted 
deliberately and with knowledge that the representation was 
false.” Id. (quoting Curran, 20 F.3d at 567). That result, we 
wrote, “comports with the generally understood meaning of 
‘knowingly’ and with the intermediate level of interpretation 
of ‘willfully’ articulated by the Supreme Court in Bryan—that 
is, knowledge of the general unlawfulness of the conduct at 
issue—which we believe adequately demarcates the boundary 
between innocent and unlawful conduct in this context.” Id. at 
211–12 (citing Bryan, 524 U.S. at 195 & n. 23). And we 
rejected the suggestion that a mens rea of “knowingly and 
willfully” required “the government . . . to prove that [the 
defendant] actually knew of [the law allegedly violated].” Id. 
at 212. So too here. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A) 




We have declined that approach in other prosecutions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). For example, in Gumbs, we considered 
a tandem prosecution brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 287. 
There, we clarified Curran, explaining that “in a prosecution 
under [18 U.S.C.] § 2(b), the government must show the 
following mens rea elements: (1) that the defendant had the 
mens rea required by the underlying statute; and (2) that the 
defendant willfully caused the innocent intermediary to 
commit the act prohibited by the underlying statute.” Gumbs, 
283 F.3d at 135. In other words, § 2(b) does not automatically 
alter the “most natural interpretation” of “willfully.” United 
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The most 
natural interpretation of section 2(b) is that a defendant with 
the mental state necessary to violate the underlying section is 
guilty of violating that section if he intentionally causes 
another to commit the requisite act.” (emphasis omitted)); see 
also United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“The natural reading of §§ 2(b) and 1001 is this: the 
government may show mens rea simply by proof (1) that the 
defendant knew that the statements to be made were false (the 
mens rea for the underlying offense—§ 1001) and (2) that the 
defendant intentionally caused such statements to be made by 
another (the additional mens rea for § 2(b)).”).  
Under Smukler’s approach, we would apply the Cheek-
Ratzlaf heightened standard of “willfully” to FECA offenses 
when paired with an aiding and abetting charge. No matter, he 
says, that this would require us to apply different meanings to 
the same word in the same statute. But our interpretive kit 
includes no such tool. Rather, it is a fundamental interpretive 
norm that “[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory 
text is generally read the same way each time it appears.” 
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Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143.10 “[W]hether section 2(b) require[s] a 
knowing violation of the law” cannot “turn on the context in 
which the statement was made.” Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101. 
“Moreover, if a defendant was prosecuted under section 2(b) 
and a criminal section other than section 1001,” as here, 
“whether section 2(b) required a knowing violation of the law 
would turn not only on the nature of the other section but also 
on the context of the alleged violation of that section.” Id. As 
the Second Circuit hypothesized, “[a]side from the obvious 
interpretative difficulties that this approach would take,” 
giving “willfully” a malleable interpretation under § 2(b) 
would make it dependent on the context of the underlying 
statute. Id. So “however ‘willfully’ is to be interpreted under 
section 2(b), it should be interpreted consistently.” Id.  
We agree. As a result, we decline Smukler’s invitation 
to “open Pandora’s jar,” by “reading [‘willfully’] differently 
for each code section to which it applies.” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 




10 We note that while Curran tethers its approach to 
Ratzlaf, other courts have disagreed. See Hsia, 176 F.3d at 522 
(noting that Curran “extends Ratzlaf too far”); see also 
Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101 (concluding Curran “focused its 
attention almost exclusively on the federal election laws and 
explicitly limited its decision to ‘cases brought under sections 
2(b) and 1001 in the federal election law context’—indicating 
that in other contexts, the court might interpret section 2(b)’s 




B. Smukler’s Convictions at Counts V and VI 
Contravene Curran 
 
 Counts V and VI charged Smukler with violating 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001(a)(1) by causing the false statements of 
others within the Brady and Margolies campaigns. On these 
counts, the District Court’s instruction on “willfully” missed 
the mark established by Curran. As we explained, under 
Curran, “a proper charge for willfulness in cases brought under 
[18 U.S.C. §§] 2(b) and 1001 in the federal election law 
context requires the prosecution to prove that defendant knew 
of the [statutory] obligations, that he attempted to frustrate 
those obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful.” 
20 F.3d at 569; see also Starnes, 583 F.3d at 211 (noting 
Curran “held that the strictest interpretation of criminal 
willfulness governed tandem violations of §§ 1001 and 2(b) in 
the federal election law context” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 Counts V and VI charged Smukler with such “tandem” 
violations of §§ 1001 and 2(b). The supporting allegations 
center on Smukler’s actions during the Brady and Margolies 
campaigns, so they occurred “in the federal election law 
context.” Curran, 20 F.3d at 569. While Curran’s “federal 
election law context” modification is too broad in other 
scenarios, it does apply to these counts.  
 The Government brings two arguments in rebuttal, but 
neither prevails. First, that Bryan abrogated Curran. It did not, 
as the Supreme Court limited its holding. See Bryan, 524 U.S. 
at 199–200 (“[O]ur grant of certiorari was limited to the narrow 
legal question whether knowledge of the licensing requirement 
[of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)] is an essential element of the 
offense.”). So we must follow the narrow holding in Curran. 
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Second, even if the District Court erred, any error was 
harmless. Not so. For error to be harmless, we must “conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have 
been the same absent the error.” Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 19 (1999). “When the error involves a mens rea 
instruction, ‘[a] verdict may still stand, despite erroneous jury 
instructions, where the predicate facts conclusively establish 
[mens rea], so that no rational jury could find that the defendant 
committed the relevant criminal act’ without also finding the 
requisite mens rea.” United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 598 
(3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Whitney v. 
Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 260 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
 Based on our holding in Curran, the District Court’s 
instructions did not provide the proper guidance. The jury 
needed to consider Smukler’s culpability based on the 
heightened “willfully” standard—that Smukler knew the legal 
duty of the particular laws charged. After reviewing the record, 
we cannot conclude that “no reasonable jury could find that 
th[is] element was not present.” United States v. Andrews, 681 
F.3d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 2012). So we will vacate Smukler’s 
conviction on these counts. 
IV.  SMUKLER’S OTHER CHALLENGES LACK MERIT 
 Smukler brings three remaining challenges to his 
convictions. First, he argues that the District Court erred by not 
finding a portion of Count II outside the statute of limitations. 
Second, he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence produced on 
Count V. Finally, he sees error in the District Court’s failure to 
give specific unanimity charges to the jury on Counts V and X. 
We have already held that Smukler’s conviction at Count V 
will be vacated because of the faulty jury instruction on 
“willfully,” so we need not reach his other arguments on that 
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count. As to Smukler’s other challenges, we find no error and 
will affirm. 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting 
Smukler’s Motion to Dismiss Count II 
 
 Count II of the superseding indictment charged Smukler 
with violating 52 U.S.C. §§ 30109(d)(1)(A)(i) and 30116, by 
knowingly and willfully causing the Brady campaign to make 
contributions to the Moore campaign in excess of the limits of 
FECA, at an aggregated amount of $25,000 or more.11 Recall 
the basis: the three payments Smukler steered from the Brady 
campaign to the Moore campaign. The first, a June 11, 2012 
payment of $40,000 routed through VDS, a Smukler-owned 
consulting company. The second, a July 10, 2012 payment of 
$25,000 sent through VDS. And the third, an August 23, 2012 
payment of $25,000 from Smukler’s associate Jones to 
Cavaness. Smukler argues two of the three contributions fell 
outside the statute of limitations. We disagree. 
 Since the last of the three payments occurred on August 
23, 2012 and the grand jury did not indict Smukler until 
October 24, 2017, the indictment would ordinarily be outside 
FECA’s five-year statute of limitations. See 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30145. But before the statute of limitations ran on the August 
 
11 FECA makes it a crime to “knowingly and willfully 
commit[] a violation” that “involves the making . . . of any 
contribution . . . aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar 
year.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i). Section 30116 sets the 
limit on contributions to a political campaign at $2,000 per 
election, adjusted for inflation. For the 2012 election cycle, the 
contribution limit was $2,500 per election.  
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2012 payment, Smukler signed a tolling agreement.12 The 
agreement, executed on August 21, 2017 and extended on 
September 25, 2017, moved the deadline for charges out to 
October 26, 2017. The first indictment was returned before the 
expiration of the extended tolling agreement and, citing Dees, 
the District Court found all three payments within the statute 
of limitations. We agree with that analysis. 
 In Dees, the defendant was charged with violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), making it a crime to use “unauthorized 
access devices”—there credit cards—to “obtain[] anything of 
value aggregating $1,000 or more” during “any one-year 
 
12 The August tolling agreement states that Smukler 
agrees to toll any applicable statute of limitations about: 
 
charges arising out of a payment from the Bob 
Brady for Congress campaign committee on or 
about August 23, 2012 to D. Jones & Associates 
in the amount of $25,000 and the subsequent use 
of that money by D. Jones & Associates[,] from 
August 23, 2017 to September 26, 2017.  
 
(App. at 133.) 
 
In paragraph six of the agreement, Smukler 
acknowledges that he “understand[s] that by agreeing to toll, 
and thus not to assert, the claim of statute of limitations, [he is] 
giving up any rights [he] may have under the federal statute of 
limitations provisions regarding charges that may result from 
the investigation described in this document for which the 




period.” 215 F.3d at 379 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)). 
Dees used credit cards to make three fraudulent purchases, 
only one of which occurred within the limitations period. Id. 
We held that because the third purchase fell within five years 
of the indictment, “the offense as actually charged was 
completed on . . . the date of the last purchase” and so “the 
statute of limitations started running at that time.” Id. at 380. 
“[I]nasmuch as the offense is defined as activity ‘during any 
one-year period,’” we explained, “the offense is complete as to 
any one-year period when there is or are unauthorized uses of 
access devices, and the aggregated value of things obtained 
through the use of those access devices within the one-year 
period ending on its last day equaled or exceeded $1,000.” Id.  
 The enforcement provision of FECA, 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30109, is worded similarly to the statute considered in Dees, 
and likewise provides for aggregation during a one-year 
period.13 For that reason, the District Court held that “Dees 
 
13 Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i) (“Any person who 
knowingly and willfully commits a violation of any provision 
of this Act which involves the making, receiving, or reporting 
of any contribution, donation, or expenditure . . . aggregating 
$25,000 or more during a calendar year shall be fined under 
Title 18, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both[.]”) 
with 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (“Whoever . . . knowingly and 
with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more 
unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and 
by such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 
or more during that period . . . shall, if the offense affects 





governs this case and that ‘inasmuch as the offense is defined 
as activity during any one-year period the offense is complete 
as to any one-year period’ on the date of the last contribution 
identified in the calendar year 2012.” (App. at 25 (quoting 
Dees, 215 F.3d at 380).) So “[t]he Government properly 
charged that defendant and his co-conspirators caused 
payments aggregating at least $25,000 in a calendar year, 
between June 2012 and August 2012.” (App. at 25.)  
 Smukler disagrees and argues that he only agreed to toll 
the August 2012 payment, not the two earlier ones. In other 
words, he “did not agree to toll the statute as to any charges 
‘arising out of’ the totality of payments in the same calendar 
year in which the August 2012 payment was made.” (Opening 
Br. at 32.) Since each of the three payments would have 
independently sufficed to support a felony charge under FECA 
as each totaled $25,000 or more, the earlier payments would 
not “hav[e] [their] origins in, the third payment.” (Opening Br. 
at 32.) This interpretation, he contends, is “the better plain-
language understanding of the agreement.” (Opening Br. at 
33.) 
 We begin with the self-evident: “the language of a 
contract . . . matters greatly.” United States v. Goodson, 544 
F.3d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 2008). Yet Smukler advocates for an 
unnaturally narrow reading of his agreement. First, “arising out 
of” is a broad provision. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 
157 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting “the general 
consensus that the phrase ‘arising out of’ should be given a 
broad reading such as ‘originating from’ or ‘growing out of’ or 
‘flowing from’ or ‘done in connection with’”) (citing cases); 
see also In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 
938 F.3d 515, 523 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining “arising out of . . 
. in a contract” is “indicative of an extremely broad agreement” 
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(cleaned up)); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice 
Litig. All Agent Actions, 133 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (use 
of “arising out of” shows broad drafting). Second, the 
agreement put Smukler on fair notice of possible charges under 
52 U.S.C. § 30109, which includes an aggregating provision 
during a calendar year for campaign contribution violations. 
Third, Smukler elsewhere agreed that “[n]othing . . . limit[s] 
the ability of the United States to bring criminal charges prior 
to the expiration of th[e] tolling agreement,” and that he waived 
all rights under the applicable statute of limitations “regarding 
charges that may result from the investigation described in 
th[e] document.” (App. at 138.) 
 Smukler tries to distinguish Dees, asserting that because 
each of the three payments was for “$25,000 or more,” each 
independently sufficed to support a felony charge on the 
Government’s theory under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A). 
While true, nothing in the statute suggests that the Government 
had to indict Smukler on separate charges. Reading the statute 
in that way would render “aggregating” surplusage. See 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every 
word . . . is to be given effect[.]”). And no normal reading of 
the statute would permit aggregation if one of the payments 
had been only $24,999, but not when all were for $25,000 or 
more. 
 For these reasons, while the agreement only references 
the August 23, 2012 payment, the potential charges emanating 
from that payment are not similarly limited. Whether Smukler 
assumed a narrower reading is not relevant, as our role is to 
“focus not on intent, but on words.” United States v. Damon, 
933 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 2019). We will therefore affirm this 
count of conviction.  
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B. The Jury Instructions at Count X Were Not Plainly 
Erroneous  
 
 Smukler also claims that the lack of a specific unanimity 
instruction on the false statement charges in Counts V and X 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict. 
The parties agree we review for plain error because Smukler 
failed to raise this issue at trial. Under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b) “we must decide whether (1) an error 
occurred, (2) the error is ‘plain,’ and (3) it ‘affect[s] substantial 
rights.’” United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 
2019) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 
(1993) (alteration in original)). Meeting all three conditions 
allows a court discretion to correct a “particularly egregious” 
error, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), if the 
error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 
U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). Because we have already determined 
that Smukler’s conviction at Count V must be vacated, we will 
only review Count X. 
 Under the Sixth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. It is “unmistakable” that the Framers and Ratifiers 
of our Constitution understood “trial by an impartial jury” to 
mean that “[a] jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to 
convict.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) 
(explaining that juror unanimity stretches back to 14th century 
England, where it was “accepted as a vital right protected by 
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the common law”); see also United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 
442, 453 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well settled that a defendant in 
a federal criminal trial has a constitutional right to a unanimous 
verdict.”). 
 The right to a unanimous verdict “includes the right to 
have the jury instructed that in order to convict, it must reach 
unanimous agreement on each element of the offense charged.” 
Gonzalez, 905 F.3d at 183 (quoting Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 453). 
Such an instruction is known as the “general unanimity 
instruction.” United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 
1987). “Typically, when an indictment alleges a number of 
different factual bases for the defendants’ criminal liability, the 
general unanimity instruction ensures that the jury 
unanimously agrees on the factual basis for a conviction.” 
Gonzalez, 905 F.2d at 183. But when “a statute enumerates 
alternative routes for its violation, it may be less clear . . . 
whether these are mere means of committing a single offense 
(for which unanimity is not required) or whether these are 
independent elements of the crime (for which unanimity is 
required).” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Yeaman, 94 
F.3d at 453). And so, in some cases, a “general unanimity 
instruction” is not sufficient, and “a more specific unanimity 
instruction” is necessary. Id. (citing Beros, 833 F.2d at 460). 
 But “a specific unanimity instruction is the exception to 
the ‘routine case,’” United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 
312 (3d Cir. 1991), only applicable when “complexity . . . or 
other factors, creates the potential that the jury will be 
confused,” Beros, 833 F.3d at 460. In most, “even where an 
indictment alleges numerous factual bases for criminal 
liability,” “a ‘general unanimity instruction will ensure that the 
jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a conviction.’” 
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Gonzalez, 905 F.3d at 184 (quoting Cusumano, 943 F.2d at 
312). 
Count X charged Smukler with: 
[W]illfully caus[ing] the authorized campaign 
committee of a candidate for the United States 
House of Representatives to falsely report to the 
FEC contributions received by that committee 
over $200, to wit causing Candidate C 2014 to 
report to the FEC payments from Black and 
Blue and InfoVoter as refunds when in fact 
those payments were unlawful contributions 
routed through those companies aggregating 
$25,000 and more in calendar year 2014, and 
causing Candidate C 2014 to report 
contributions from SMUKLER in the names of 
others.14 
 
(App. at 123.) 
 Because Smukler did not request a specific unanimity 
instruction, the Court charged the jury on general unanimity: 
I want to remind you that your verdict, whether 
it is guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. To 
find the defendant guilty of an offense, every one 
of you must agree that the Government has 
overcome the presumption of innocence with 
evidence that proves each element of that offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To find the 
 
14 In violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(a)(1), 
30104(b)(5)(A), 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
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defendant not guilty, every one of you must 
agree that the Government has failed to convince 
you beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
(App. at 1954:9–16.) 
 This is not error, let alone plain error, as Smukler again 
asks us to apply an extraordinary standard to an 
unextraordinary case. As we explained, neither FECA, nor the 
facts offered by the Government, are so complex as to risk jury 
confusion. It is also not plain that the charge depended, as 
Smukler contends, on “a composite theory of guilt.” Beros, 833 
F.2d at 462. This theory, which we explained in Beros, “applies 
where the Government advances different factual theories 
concerning the defendant[’s] charged conduct, each of which 
could independently satisfy the elements of the crime.” 
Gonzalez, 905 F.3d at 184. In Beros, the government 
proceeded with a sixteen-count indictment, with two of the 
counts “alleg[ing] four separate and distinct theories of 
criminal activity” and “enumerat[ing] several acts upon which 
a finding of guilt could be predicated.” 833 F.2d at 461. 
Concerned by the disjunctive nature of the charging statutes 
and the multiple, factually distinct allegations of criminal 
conduct, we could “easily imagine” juror disagreement. Id. For 
example, four of the jurors might have focused on Beros’s 
improper use of a credit card, another four on his unapproved 
hotel upgrades, and the final four on his turning a business trip 
into a personal vacation. See id. at 461–62. So, we held that 
“[w]hen the government chooses to prosecute under an 
indictment advancing multiple theories, it must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt at least one of the theories to the satisfaction 
of the entire jury.” Id. at 462.  
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Here, however, the Government advances only a single 
theory of liability. Count X charges Smukler with multiple 
FECA offenses, but at least arguably under a single factual 
basis: that Smukler caused the Margolies campaign to make 
false reports to the FEC. Those falsities violated FECA’s 
prohibition against (1) improperly reporting that the “refunds” 
from Black and Blue Media and InfoVoter were, in fact, lawful 
contributions; and (2) improperly reporting contributions from 
individuals which were, in fact, contributions made by 
Smukler.  
 And even assuming this satisfies Olano’s first and 
second prongs—that there was an error, and the error was 
plain—Smukler cannot show that the error “affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings.” Payano, 930 F.3d 
at 192 (alteration in original) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 
At Counts VII and VIII the jury found Smukler guilty of 
violating the underlying FECA provisions that Count X 
charged him with causing the Margolies campaign to falsely 
report. There is overwhelming evidence in the record that 
Smukler duped the campaign into assuming the legitimacy of 
these contributions. The mere fact that the jury found that 
Smukler concealed the true nature of these contributions in 
Counts VII and VIII is likely enough to satisfy Count X’s 
charge.15 While Smukler bears the burden on appeal, he 
 
15 For instance, recall that Jones testified that his 
contribution to the Margolies campaign depended on Smukler 
reimbursing him, which Smukler did by sending Jones a check 
from InfoVoter. And Smukler, as head of the campaign, 
instructed Margolies’ campaign treasurer that the contributions 




provides no showing for how a specific unanimity charge 
would “have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.” Payano, 930 F.3d at 192 (quoting Olano, 507 
U.S. at 734). In short, Smukler has far from satisfied the 
exacting standard of plain error review. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of 
conviction at Counts V and VI, and we will affirm all other 
counts of Smukler’s conviction.  
